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I. INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this study is to bring insight from the civil law 
tradition to the corporate debate on asset partitioning, which has developed 
over the last decade in the common law literature.  Exposing common law 
scholars to legal solutions that are rooted in civil law systems will 
potentially transform the traditional approach taken by comparative civil 
law scholars in this field.  In fact, civil law scholars have produced an 
extensive body of literature on the feasibility of transplanting one of the 
most successful products of equity—trust law—to the civil law tradition.1  
In comparative law studies, scholars have overlooked the possibility that 
the common law legal system could benefit from solutions developed under 
the civil law tradition with respect to the partitioning of assets. 
Therefore, this Article intends to create a two-way dialogue between 
the common law and civil law traditions regarding this particular area of 
law, and to reveal efficient solutions developed in continental Europe. 
Asset partitioning can be defined either as the segregation of an 
owner’s assets from a firm’s creditors, or the segregation of an 
organization’s assets from its owners’ personal creditors.  Henry Hansmann 
and Reinier Kraakman have emphasized the latter aspect, in particular, 
suggesting that an organization is truly characterized by such a protection 
of its assets.2  These authors have noticed that the legal effect of this 
 
 * S.J.D. Candidate, University of Pennsylvania Law School; Assistant Professor of 
Private Law, University of Roma Tre.  I am grateful to Anita Anand, Henry Hansmann, 
Edward B. Rock and David A. Skeel for their invaluable comments.  I am also grateful to 
those who gave me comments at the 2008 Italian Society of Law and Economics Annual 
Conference, at the 2009 Roma, Siena Tel Aviv, Toronto Law & Economics International 
Workshop, and at the 2009 Canadian Law and Economics Association Conference. 
 1. See, e.g., MAURIZIO LUPOI, TRUSTS:  A COMPARATIVE STUDY 268 (2000) (discussing 
the development of the transition of trust law into the civil law framework in Europe). 
 2. Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The Essential Role of Organizational Law, 
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characterization of asset partitioning cannot be effectively achieved by 
contract alone.  A special rule of law is necessary in order to exclude 
claims by owners’ personal creditors on a firm’s assets without those 
creditors’ consent.3 
This Article will identify, from a functional perspective, the costs and 
benefits of different legal methods used to partition assets.  The 
comparative analysis of these various partitioning devices will help us 
understand the economics of achieving affirmative asset partitioning 
through the creation of a new legal entity, as opposed to doing so through a 
property law which grants “asset independence” within the boundaries of 
the same entity. 
While American legal scholars conceive asset partitioning exclusively 
through the formation of a new legal entity, the civil law tradition allows 
this legal effect to be achieved within the boundaries of the same legal 
subject.  This tradition avoids the creation of multiple legal entities. 
In the common law system, there is a sharp trade-off between the costs 
avoided due to asset partitioning (e.g., lower monitoring costs for 
specialized creditors), and the benefits lost by not having legal integration 
take place within a single entity (e.g., information economies of scale).  In 
contrast, by allowing a legal subject to partition these assets not only 
outside but also within the boundaries of the same legal subject, the “asset 
independence” doctrine of the civil law tradition successfully overcomes 
this trade-off. 
The analysis is organized as follows:  Part II provides a description of 
the current debate on asset partitioning in the U.S., i.e., the corporate theory 
debate.  Part III describes the doctrine of “asset independence” rooted in 
the civil law tradition.  Part IV discusses the historical evolution of asset 
partitioning in civil and common law traditions.  Part V examines the costs 
and benefits of civil and common law regulations on asset partitioning, 
with regard to different business transactions (including asset securitization 
and the organization of a mutual fund).  Finally, Part VI offers concluding 
remarks describing how financial transactions are the driving power behind 
the current convergence between civil and common law traditions on asset 
partitioning. 
II. THE CORPORATE THEORY DEBATE ON ASSET PARTITIONING IN THE 
U.S. 
In 2000, Hansmann and Kraakman published an essay entitled The 
Essential Role of Organizational Law in the Yale Law Journal.4  Since 
 
110 YALE L.J. 387 (2000). 
 3. Id. at 394. 
 4. Id. at 387. 
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then, a lively doctrinal debate has developed over the notion of asset 
partitioning and its attributes.5 
The fundamental question posed by these two authors is:  what 
essential role did organizational law play in modern society? 
Hansmann and Kraakman offer an answer that diverges from the 
traditional position, which singled out limited liability as the defining 
characteristic of several business organizations.6  Instead, according to 
Hansmann and Kraakman, what truly characterizes an organization is 
precisely the reverse of limited liability:  assigning to the organization’s 
creditors a pool of assets that is shielded from the claims of the creditors of 
that entity’s owners and managers.7 
More specifically, asset partitioning is characterized by two 
symmetrical sides.  The first side, which these authors label as “defensive 
asset partitioning” or “owner shielding,” is the most traditional and well-
explored.8  By these terms, they mean the protection of the personal assets 
of a firm’s owners from the firm’s creditors:  what traditionally is called 
limited liability.9  The second side, “affirmative asset partitioning” or 
“entity shielding,” represents the reverse of defensive asset partitioning, 
where the terms refer to the protection of a firm’s assets from the claims of 
personal creditors of its owners and managers.10 
The law governing business corporations is one of the clearest 
examples of affirmative asset partitioning.  Through incorporation, an 
individual is able to commit a pool of assets to a specific business and 
specified group of creditors.  The assets, in coming under the ownership of 
 
 5. John Armour & Michael J. Whincop, The Proprietary Foundations of Corporate 
Law, 27 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 429 (2007); Margaret M. Blair, Locking in Capital:  What 
Corporate Law Achieved for Business Organizers in the Nineteenth Century, 51 UCLA L. 
REV. 387 (2003); Edward M. Iacobucci & George G. Triantis, Economic and Legal 
Boundaries of Firms, 93 VA. L. REV. 515 (2007); Paul G. Mahoney, Contract or 
Concession? An Essay on the History of Corporate Law, 34 GA. L. REV. 873 (2000); Lynn 
A. Stout, On the Nature of Corporations, U. ILL. L. REV. 253 (2005). 
 6. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Limited Liability and the 
Corporations, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 89, 97 (1985) (finding that “limited liability facilitates 
optimal investment decisions. . . . The increased availability of funds for projects with 
positive net values is the real benefit of limited liability”); FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & 
DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 41 (1991) (“The 
instances of ‘unlimited’ liability are few . . . . Limitations on liability turn out to be 
pervasive.”). 
 7. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 2, at 394. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. at 393-94, 423; Henry Hansmann, Reinier Kraakman & Richard Squire, Law 
and Rise of the Firm, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1335, 1339 (2006) (relabeling as “owner 
shielding,” the phenomenon that, in their previous work, was labeled “defensive asset 
partitioning”). 
 10. Hansmann, Kraakman & Squire, supra note 9, at 1359 (discussing “entity shielding 
in Roman peculium businesses”). 
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the corporation, achieve the desired goal of partitioning them from the 
personal creditors of the corporation’s shareholders.  The same mechanism 
could be chosen by a company that wishes to separate the creditors along 
two distinct lines of business.  Creating two distinct subsidiary corporations 
allows a single parent company to partition the assets in separate pools, 
each one committed to a specified group of creditors. 
Until Hansmann and Kraakman’s article, corporate literature had 
traditionally overlooked the affirmative side of asset partitioning.  
Subsequently, several corporate studies have focused more on this 
characteristic, pointing to it as the key peculiarity of legal personality.  
Using various terminologies (e.g., “forward partitioning,”11 “capital lock-
in,”12 “asset separation from shareholders,”13 “resource commitment”14), 
corporate scholars have agreed with Hansmann and Kraakman that the 
essential—if traditionally overlooked—contribution of business 
organization law is to permanently commit owners’ contributions to a firm 
so that those assets cannot be suddenly withdrawn from the firm by either 
the owners’ creditors or the owners themselves. 
One of the merits of Hansmann and Kraakman’s article is not simply 
to have shifted the attention of corporate scholars to this less-explored, 
affirmative side of asset partitioning, but to have prompted a 
reconsideration of the common notion of a firm as a mere “nexus of 
contracts,” and of corporate law, however specialized, as a mere branch of 
contract law.15 
In the seventies, the economic model which recognized a firm as 
nothing more than a complex set of contracts became the dominant 
approach, thanks to the contributions of Alchian and Demsetz16 and, a few 
 
 11. Mahoney, supra note 5, at 876-77 (using “forward partitioning” to designate the 
reverse of limited liability, which is, in turn, referred to as “reverse partitioning”). 
 12. Blair, supra note 5, at 387 (referring to the ability to commit capital to a specific 
investment, with no possibility for shareholders and their creditors to extract assets from the 
firm as “capital lock-in.”  The same terminology has been used by Stout, supra note 5, at 
254. 
 13. WILLIAM A. KLEIN & JOHN C. COFFEE, BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE: 
LEGAL AND ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES 108 (9th ed. 2004). 
 14. Blair, supra note 5, at 392 (explaining her terminology by noting that “perhaps as 
important as protecting the assets of the enterprise from participants’ creditors . . . was the 
role played in establishing a pool of assets that was not subject to being liquidated or 
dissolved by any of the individual participants who might want to recover their 
investment.”). 
 15. Bernard S. Black, Is Corporate Law Trivial? A Political and Economic Analysis, 84 
NW. U. L. REV. 542, 549 (1990) (discussing Ralph Winter, Henry Butler, Frank Easterbrook 
and Dan Fischel's view of the "corporate charter as a freely chosen contract between 
shareholders and managers"). 
 16. Armen A. Alchian & Harlod Demsetz, Production, Information Costs and 
Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777 (1972). 
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years later, Jensen and Meckling.17  If a firm is nothing more than the sum 
of contracts binding different stakeholders (e.g., shareholders, officers, 
directors, debtholders, employees and suppliers), corporate law risks 
becoming trivialized, since it would only serve to introduce a set of default 
standards for business organizations that could also be introduced, at a 
higher cost, by commercial actors.18 
Hansmann and Kraakman show in their essay that the contractarian 
theory of corporate law is not in itself sufficient to explain the role played 
by organizational law.  They observe that, in the universe of business 
organizations, there are outcomes which cannot be practicably established 
by contract alone, one of which being “affirmative asset partitioning.”19 
Without a special rule of law to limit the rights of owners’ personal 
creditors over firms’ assets, it would be necessary for each owner of a firm 
to negotiate a waiver with these creditors regarding the seizing of the firm’s 
assets, or an agreement subordinating their claim to those of the firm’s 
creditors.  Such affirmative asset partitioning through the use of contracts 
would not only impose prohibitively high transaction costs (since each 
owner would have to convince all of his individual creditors to accept this 
waiver), but also create obvious moral hazards and, consequently, 
excessive monitoring costs.  Each waiver, in fact, by improving the 
position of a firm’s creditors, creates a collective benefit for all of its 
owners by reducing the cost of credit.  But, at the same time, such a waiver 
increases the personal cost of credit to individual owners.  As a 
consequence, each owner has a clear incentive to act as a free rider, and 
omit the waiver from his personal contracts.  This opportunistic behavior, 
which improves the position of the free rider’s personal creditors to the 
detriment of the firm’s creditors, effectively reduces the free rider’s 
personal borrowing costs while imposing an increase in the firm’s 
borrowing costs to the rest of the owners.  The possibility for this type of 
opportunistic activity, which would increase with the number of owners, 
leads to excessive monitoring costs that render a successful partitioning 
 
 17. Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm:  Managerial 
Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976). 
 18. The classic approach of Alchian and Demsetz, and Jensen and Meckling, has been 
further developed.  Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 6, passim. The Law & Economics 
approach views corporate law as a tool for “filling gaps” by introducing the default rules 
that would be desired by the parties had they been able to contract without transaction costs.  
See Richard A. Posner & Andrew M. Rosenfield, Impossibility and Related Doctrines in 
Contract Law:  An Economic Analysis, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 83 (1977) (commenting on the 
doctrines of impossibility, impracticability and frustration in contract law).  On the 
significance of corporate law in the light of the “nexus of contracts” theory, see Bernard S. 
Black, supra note 15, at 549. 
 19. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 2, at 406; Hansmann, Kraakman & Squire, 
supra note 9, at 1340-41. 
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practically impossible without a special rule of law.20 
Under corporate law—or more generally, organizational law—
excluding claims of personal creditors over a firm’s assets without their 
consent allows owners to create an affirmative asset partitioning, without 
incurring the transaction and monitoring costs highlighted above, simply by 
using a property law—a rule that is “good against the world”.21  This rule 
of law, which according to Hansmann and Kraakman is the essential 
contribution of organizational law, challenges the perspective that views 
corporate law as a mere branch of contract law, recovering a proprietary 
foundation for it.22 
Hansmann and Kraakman’s analysis has two essential merits to be 
stressed:  first, it recognizes the affirmative side of asset partitioning as the 
core defining characteristic of an organization and second, it labels this 
attribute as one of property, made possible only by a special rule of law.  
From these two main ideas, a functional analysis of the benefits and costs 
of asset partitioning has followed in the corporate theory literature.23 
 
 20. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 2, at 406-11; Hansmann, Kraakman & Squire, 
supra note 9, at 1340-41. 
 21. See Henry Hansmann & Ugo Mattei, Trust Law in the United States:  A Basic Study 
of Its Special Contribution, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 133, 134 (1998) (reaching the conclusion that 
the contribution offered by the law of trusts is “that it facilitates the partitioning of assets 
into bundles that can conveniently be pledged separately to different classes of creditors”).  
These authors believe that the classic literature focusing on fiduciary duties as the main 
characteristic of trust law overlooks the point that these aspects could be achieved even 
without a special property rule by simply using the basic tools of contract and agency law.  
Id. at 136.  But cf. John H. Langbein, The Contractarian Basis of the Law of Trusts, 105 
YALE L.J. 625 (1995) (discussing the contractarian underpinning to trust law).  See also 
Robert H. Sitkoff, An Agency Costs Theory of Trust Law, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 621, 627 
(2004) (advancing the claim that trust law blends features that are familiar from both 
property and contract law). 
 22. See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 2, at 422 (“[B]oth organizational law and 
the law of security interests are at bottom, in important part, forms of property law:  They 
define the types of property interests that can be created and made binding against third 
parties.”); see also Iacobucci & Triantis, supra note 5, at 569 (emphasizing the concept that 
legal partitioning can be realized only by way of a property law and that, consequently, a 
corporation is more than a nexus of contracts); Blair, supra note 5, at 407 (noting that an 
understanding of separate entity status under the law is key to understanding how 
incorporation changes the relationship between stakeholders into something different from a 
simple agency relationship); Armour & Whincop, supra note 5, at 431 (stating that the 
allocation of property rights to firm assets is significant for governance of the enterprise).  
This position, while recognizing the role of corporate law as a tool to provide a set of 
standard organizational forms (contractarian perspective), stresses a “Coasean” idea of the 
firm as an instrument to eliminate market transactions.  Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the 
Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 388 (1937); OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS 
OF CAPITALISM (1985); OLIVER HART, FIRMS, CONTRACTS AND FINANCIAL STRUCTURE 
(1995). 
 23. The benefits of affirmative asset partitioning include the reduction of monitoring 
costs and preservation of beneficiaries’ assets. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 2, at 
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This Article aims to bring a comparative perspective to the analysis 
developed up to this point in the U.S. legal literature and, in particular, the 
European civil law tradition, with respect to asset partitioning.  Bringing 
the latter into the current debate not only serves to broaden the more 
limited American version of the doctrine but, on a more pragmatic level, 
points to the revision of conclusions reached by American scholars in their 
functional analysis of this legal phenomenon. 
III. ENHANCING THE UNITED STATES DEBATE ON ASSET PARTITIONING 
IN LIGHT OF THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION 
In the civil law tradition, affirmative asset partitioning captured the 
attention of legal scholars in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century 
when the notion of juridical person was fully distinguished from that of 
“asset independence” (also termed asset autonomy).  At this stage in the 
civil law system, it became clear that in order to create an affirmative asset 
partitioning it would not be necessary to form a new legal entity or juridical 
person.  Legal scholars began to acknowledge the possibility that a fixed 
number of property laws (known in the civil law tradition as numerus 
clausus) could enable a legal subject (either a natural person or a legal 
entity) to be the owner of multiple, separate pools of assets, each 
committed to a different purpose and pledged to a specified group of 
creditors (“asset independence” doctrine).24 
The possibility that a legal subject could operate as the owner of 
multiple funds or patrimonies, which are committed to different groups of 
creditors, without necessarily forming a new legal entity, is, in a nutshell, 
what distinguishes the “asset independence” doctrine of civil law countries 
from the affirmative asset partitioning doctrine developed in the United 
States. 
Even though the juridical person doctrine has been much less 
influential in the United States than in Europe, American legal scholars 
nevertheless seem unwilling to conceive of an asset partitioning effect 
without the formation of a new legal entity. 
According to Hansmann and Kraakman, a firm has two fundamental 
attributes:  a well-defined decision-making authority and the ability to bond 
 
398-405.  The benefits of defensive asset partitioning include reduction of monitoring costs 
as well as providing economies of transfer and risk sharing.  Id. at 423-27.  See also 
Hansmann, Kraakman & Squire, supra note 9, at 1343-54 (describing the benefits of entity 
shielding); Iacobucci & Triantis, supra note 5, at 515 (examining the relationship between 
economic integration and legal partitioning). 
 24. In Germany, this phenomenon is well-known as Zweckvermögenstheorie.  ALOIS 
BRINZ, LEHRBUCH DES PANDEKTENRECHT (2d ed. 1879); ERNST IMMANUEL BEKKER, SYSTEM 
DES HEUTIGEN PANDEKTENRECHT (1886).  In Italy, the contribution of FRANCESCO FERRARA, 
TRATTATO DI DIRITTO CIVILE ITALIANO (1921) is fundamental. 
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its contracts with an existing pool of assets.25  Since a natural person has 
both these attributes, he or she can be defined as a firm.  However, since a 
natural person is liable for his or her contracts involving all of his or her 
assets (personal liability), in order to insulate these assets from his personal 
creditors and pledge them to a specified group, it is necessary to employ a 
separate legal person.  Accordingly, since a debt is a firm-wide obligation,26 
if a firm wishes to separate its assets from the personal assets of its owners 
and managers and commit them to a specific business purpose, it is 
necessary to create a juridical person or a separate legal entity.27 
 Since the “firm’s boundaries define the set of assets that are subject 
to the personal obligation of the firm to pay its debts,”28 if the individual or 
juridical person (e.g., a corporation) wishes to shield some of its assets 
from personal creditors and pledge them to a specified group of creditors, it 
is necessary to create a new legal subject, thereby multiplying the number 
of legal entities employed.29 
 In other words, according to this view, it is not possible to conceive 
of a juridical person or an individual owning more than one pool of assets 
without employing some kind of organizational form, since each separate 
pool is itself a distinct legal entity.30  As a consequence, given that legal 
entities incur debt on a firm-by-firm basis by pledging all their assets to 
bond their contracts, affirmative asset partitioning is conceivable only 
outside the boundaries of the same firm by partitioning assets among 
multiple legal entities.31 
This is not the lesson learned from the civil law tradition where, as 
this Article will explain, it is possible to achieve affirmative asset 
partitioning—or, to use a terminology closer to civil law, “asset 
independence”—within the boundaries of the same legal entity. 
The use of trust law certainly represents a boundary between common 
law and civil law traditions surrounding affirmative asset partitioning, and 
explains the divergence in the evolution of this doctrine.  It is evident that 
the existence of the trust device facilitated acceptance of the assets 
partitioning principle by the common law tradition.  In civil law countries, 
on the other hand, this involved a complicated doctrinal debate that added 
to the notion of partitioning the idea of the same patrimony for multiple and 
 
 25. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 2, at 391. 
 26. Iacobucci & Triantis, supra note 5, at 529. 
 27. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 2, at 393, 416.  The authors maintain that trust-
created affirmative asset partitioning creates functionally separate juridical persons. 
 28. Iacobucci & Triantis, supra note 5, at 525. 
 29. Hansmann, Kraakman & Squire, supra note 9, at 1337. 
 30. Accordingly, an individual can be considered the owner of distinct pools of assets 
when he owns shares (and not the assets) of distinct legal entities, but cannot segregate his 
own patrimony in different pools of assets without creating new legal entities. 
 31. Iacobucci & Triantis, supra note 5, at 525. 
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separate pools of assets.  Conceptually, it is easier to conceive of asset 
partitioning when it is achieved through transfer of assets to a different 
entity (e.g., the trust), than when accomplished within the same patrimony. 
Also, in civil law countries, the default rule governing the relations 
between debtor and creditors is that all of a person's property (his or her 
entire patrimony) is available for seizure and sale to satisfy the claims of 
judgment creditors (so-called “universal patrimonial liability”).32 
This principle was first introduced in modern codifications by Article 
2092 of the French Code Napoléon,33 and can be found nowadays in many 
civil codes such as the Italian Civil Code34 and the Civil Code of Québec.35 
This principle resembles the concept of the firm-wide character of 
debt examined with regard to the American debate on asset partitioning:  
all of the debtor’s property represents the common pledge of creditors.  
Nonetheless, in civil law countries, in addition to the principle of “universal 
patrimonial liability,” the law expressly provides that, in a numerus clausus 
of circumstances, a legal subject is allowed to make a division or 
partitioning of his patrimony.  As an illustration, Article 2645 of the Civil 
Code of Québec states that the common pledge does not extend to 
“property[,] which is the object of a division of patrimony permitted by 
law”.36 
In civil law countries, even if all the property normally constitutes the 
only patrimony of an individual and is pledged to bond all his 
performances, the law allows a legal subject to partition his patrimony 
among several pools of assets without creating a new legal entity.  In 
particular, “asset independence” must be recognized when a pool of assets 
is subtracted from the common pledge of personal creditors, and committed 
to a specialized group.  Consequently, each pool of assets is bonded to a 
different purpose and pledged only to creditors whose claim is connected 
with that purpose.37 
 
 32. Hansmann, Kraakman & Squire, supra note 9, at 1337.  The same is true for an 
entrepreneur.  See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 2, at 407 (explaining the if there is 
no contractual agreement to the contrary, an entrepreneur’s creditors have a right to attach 
all of his or her assets). 
 33. Art. 2092 C. civ. (“Whoever is bound is held to fulfill that duty in dealing with all 
fixed and liquid assets both now and in the future). 
 34. See Art. 2740 C.c. (“The debtor is responsible for his obligations with all his 
present and future assets.”). 
 35. Art. 2644 Civil Code of Québec states that “The property of a debtor is charged 
with the performance of his obligations and is the common pledge of creditors.”  Art. 2645 
Civil Code of Québec states that “Any person under a personal obligation charges, for its 
performance, all his property, movable and immovable, present and future.” 
 36. Art. 2645 Civil Code of Québec. 
 37. For a description of “asset independence” in the Italian literature, see Durante, 
Patrimonio (diritto civile), in 22 ENCICLOPEDIA GIURIDICA 1, 3 (1990) (describing the 
purpose of “asset independence” and its most significant legal effects); Lina Bigliazzi Geri, 
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What is clear from the studies of civil law scholars is that only the 
law, through a property rule, is capable of achieving “asset independence.”  
Accordingly, only in a numerus clausus of circumstances, provided by 
property laws, is a legal subject able to partition his patrimony in separate 
funds.38 
It must be noted that these separate pools of assets are not considered 
new legal entities.  Therefore, the “asset independence” doctrine and 
formation of a new legal entity represent alternative and sometimes 
competing legal devices to achieve affirmative asset partitioning. 
Unlike the practice followed in the United States, the “asset 
independence” doctrine of the civil law tradition allows a legal subject to 
accomplish a partitioning not only externally (through the formation of a 
new legal entity), but also within the boundaries of the same legal subject. 
This distinction is not merely semantic.  As this Article will show, the 
formation of a new legal entity and the articulation of a patrimony in 
separate pools of assets are two distinct legal techniques.  Both techniques 
can result in affirmative asset partitioning, yet they are not equivalent in 
terms of costs and benefits. 
It is also worth clarifying why the “asset independence” of civil law 
does not coincide with the floating lien device used in the United States.  A 
floating lien is a security interest that a creditor holds on a debtor’s set of 
assets, and that covers any additional property obtained by the debtor.  In 
contrast to the creditor of a segregated pool of assets, the secured creditor 
still has recourse as an unsecured creditor against the general patrimony of 
the debtor (the assets not included in the floating lien).  Furthermore, all of 
the unsecured creditors have recourse against the assets covered by the 
floating lien once the secured creditor has been fully paid.  In short, neither 
a defensive asset partitioning nor a strong affirmative asset partitioning is 
achieved through a floating lien.39 
The functional analysis conducted in Part IV will examine, from a 
comparative perspective, a series of business transactions which, in order to 
achieve their effects, require use of the affirmative asset partitioning 
mechanism. 
In particular, this Article will compare the common law and civil law 
systems with regard to the use of a corporate subsidiary as opposed to the 
 
Patrimonio autonomo e separato, in 32 ENCICLOPEDIA DEL DIRITTO 280 (1982) 
(summarizing the doctrine and its application); See FRÉDÉRIC H. SPETH, LA DIVISIBILITE DU 
PATRIMOINE ET L'ENTREPRISE D'UNE PERSONNE (1957) (affirming the presence of “asset 
independence” in French literature). 
 38. FERRARA, supra note 24, at 875. 
 39. On the notion of “floating lien,” see ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY LAWRENCE 
WESTBROOK, THE LAW OF DEBTORS AND CREDITORS:  TEXT, CASES, AND PROBLEMS 633-36 
(4th ed. 2001); STEVEN L. HARRIS & CHARLES W. MOONEY, JR., SECURITY INTERESTS IN 
PERSONAL PROPERTY:  CASES, PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS 469-76 (4th ed. 2005). 
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use of “funds committed to a specific purpose” created within the 
boundaries of the same legal entity; the regulation of asset securitization; 
the organization of mutual funds; and the differences between trust law and 
the recent regulation of fiduciary relations adopted by French legislators. 
IV. THE HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF THE ASSET PARTITIONING 
DOCTRINE 
A. The Historical Evolution of the “Asset Independence” Doctrine in the 
Civil Law Tradition 
1. The Unity and Indivisibility of the Patrimony Doctrine in the 
Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries 
In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, a metaphysical 
concept of patrimony prevailed in civil law countries which conceived of 
assets or property according to an anthropocentric vision.  Viewed this 
way, patrimony was the external manifestation of an individual and 
tangible expression of the human personality.  Patrimony, in other words, 
was considered to represent nothing more than that same human 
personality as related to objects.  This idea, rooted in natural law, 
developed out of the philosophical thought of the Enlightenment and the 
Romantic Movements.40  Such an indissolvable bond between the 
“individual and his patrimony shifted from a philosophical to a legal 
doctrine during the first half of the nineteenth century.41  In that era, 
patrimony was considered to be an attribute of the human personality.  
Since human attributes were indivisible and intangible, the patrimony was 
also considered indivisible and intangible.  Since an individual had only 
one personality, this meant, likewise, only one patrimony, which could not 
be partitioned among distinct pools of assets (singleness of patrimony 
doctrine).42 
 
 40. The idea that the bond between the individual and his patrimony is rooted in natural 
law is pointed out by Francesco Ferrara, La teoria della persona giuridica, in RIVISTA DI 
DIRITTO CIVILE 638, 664 (1911).  In the French literature, see HEINRICH AHRENS, COURS DE 
DROIT NATUREL OU DE PHILOSOPHIE DU DROIT, COMPLETE, DANS LES PRINCIPALES MATIERES, 
PAR DES APERÇUS HISTORIQUES ET POLITIQUES 71 (1892), where, adopting the absolute 
idealist philosophy of Hegel, he says:  “Thereafter, the law is developed through the various 
degrees of the spirit’s objective reality.  First, free will is manifested from an individual 
standpoint, that is as a person; the liberty created by a person is property.” 
 41. This shift is normally ascribed to a French law handbook written by a German 
scholar, K.S. Zachariae, and subsequently updated and augmented by two French scholars, 
CHARLES AUBRY & CHARLES RAU, COURS DE DROIT CIVIL FRANÇAIS, D'APRES L'OUVRAGE 
DE M. C.S. ZACHARIE (1856-1858). 
 42. Id. at 573. 
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2. The Estate as an Entity Doctrine and the Commitment of Assets 
to a Specific Purpose 
If an individual could only be the owner of one pool of assets, how did 
civil law scholars justify those circumstances where the law conceived the 
existence of autonomous pools of assets, committed to specific groups of 
creditors? 
It is worth mentioning three different cases in civil law systems that 
serve as examples in which pools of assets are exclusively committed to 
creditors whose claim is related to the same pool.  First, in the civil law 
tradition, inheritance law provides that if a devisee accepts the devise under 
benefit of inventory (i.e., a public officer is in charge of singling out and 
describing the property of the decedent), he is not personally liable for the 
decedent’s debts (defensive asset partitioning).  Also, his personal creditors 
hold junior claims to the probate estate that are subordinate to the senior 
claims of decedent’s creditors (weak affirmative asset partitioning).  
Second, Italian family law provides that spouses, together or separately, 
can constitute a “family fund” whose assets are committed to satisfy the 
family’s needs.  Spouses’ creditors who are aware that their claim is related 
to a purpose different from the family’s need have no recourse against the 
assets of the “family fund” (affirmative asset partitioning).43  Third, in the 
absence of trust law, civil law countries expressly regulate special funds 
committed to pension purposes.  In particular, the employer has to maintain 
a portion of his/her employees’ salary and assign this portion to the special 
funds.  The assets of these funds are separate from the general patrimony of 
the employer, and are unavailable to satisfy the employer's obligations to 
his personal creditors (affirmative asset partitioning).44 
In the late nineteenth century, German and Italian scholars developed 
two different theories to justify the legal existence of pools of assets that, 
because they were committed to a specific purpose and pledged to a 
specified group of creditors, were separate from the general patrimony of 
an individual. 
According to the first theory, since an individual can be the owner of 
only one patrimony, any time the law provides for the existence of an 
autonomous pool of assets, the legal system introduces a new patrimony 
that has no owner.  The specific purpose to which the assets are committed 
assures unity in this autonomous patrimony.45 
 
 43. In Italy, the “family fund” is currently regulated by arts. 167-171 of the Italian Civil 
Code. 
 44. In Italy, the partitioning between the pension funds created by employers and their 
general patrimony is provided by art. 2117 of the Italian Civil Code. 
 45. BRINZ, supra note 24, at 202.  In Italy, this theory, first developed in Germany, has 
been further analyzed by Gustavo Bonelli, La teoria della persona giuridica, in RIVISTA DI 
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According to the second theory, any time the law provides for the 
existence of a pool of assets that is separate from the general patrimony of 
the individual, the legal system recognizes the presence of a new legal 
entity.  If any separate pool of assets is considered a distinct legal entity, 
the idea that each individual can be the owner of only one patrimony is 
preserved.46 
If an individual has only one patrimony, then in order to partition his 
assets he can only participate as a residual claimant to the ownership of a 
distinct legal entity.  This latter theory recalls the view held by common 
law scholars examined above, according to which the estate separateness 
doctrine is absorbed into the concept of a juridical person.47 
3. The Substitution of the Indivisibility of the Patrimony Doctrine 
with the Numerus Clausus of “Asset Independence” Principle 
In the early twentieth century, civil law scholars began to question the 
singleness and indivisibility of patrimony doctrine (i.e., an individual can 
be the owner of one and only one patrimony, which cannot be partitioned 
in separate pools without the creation of a new legal entity).  The basis of 
this approach—the metaphysical conjunction between the human 
personality and its patrimony—was increasingly rejected by scholars.48 
At this stage, assets were no longer viewed as an external expression 
of an individual.  This is reflected by the very simple objection to the 
singleness of patrimony doctrine:  what is single and indivisible is not the 
patrimony itself, but rather the right to have a patrimony, which belongs to 
any individual as an external expression of his personality.  As a 
consequence of this new viewpoint, an individual was no longer identified 
with his patrimony, nor was the latter considered a unique attribute of the 
 
DIRITTO CIVILE, 445-508, 593-673 (1910). 
 46. Id. at 657-58. 
 47. A juridical person is traditionally defined as a legal subject distinct from the 
individuals who compose or promote it.  As a distinct legal subject, a juridical person may 
have its own legal relations with third parties, exercised through organs whose activity is not 
attributed to the individuals, but directly attributed to that juridical person.  Therefore, it is 
the juridical person, not its members, that enters into a contract, undertakes an obligation, 
acquires a claim, is summoned before a court, or brings a suit against a third party.  In the 
civil law tradition, there are different theories that try to explain this concept:  One, the 
juridical person is a fiction:  for economic and functional purposes, the legal system created 
the fictional subjectivity of entities different from individuals.  Two, the juridical person as 
reality:  the legal system simply recognizes a phenomenon that exists in social life.  Three, 
the juridical person as a device of legal language:  the juridical person is only a legal term 
used to summarize a complex body of legal rules regulating relations between individuals 
(this can be likened to the “nexus of contracts” theory of the firm).  See Ferrara, supra note 
40, passim (discussing the concept of the juridical person in the civil law tradition). 
 48. Id. at 665, 675. 
ELGUETAFINALIZED_SIX 3/31/2010  2:04:51 AM 
530 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 12:2 
 
human personality.49 
Since the patrimony is no longer necessarily indivisible, it is also no 
longer necessary to recognize a new legal entity each time the law provides 
for autonomous pools of assets.  At this stage, scholars began to 
acknowledge the possibility that a legal subject can be the owner of 
multiple, separate pools of assets, each one committed to different purposes 
and pledged to a specified group of creditors (“asset independence” 
doctrine).  In its acknowledgment that a legal subject can be the owner of 
multiple funds, the “asset independence” doctrine reacquires its force from 
the juridical person concept. 
What is clear from civil law scholars’ studies is that only the law, 
through a property rule, is capable of achieving “asset independence.”  
Accordingly, only in a numerus clausus of circumstances, provided by 
property law, is a legal subject able to partition his patrimony in separate 
funds.50 
In the light of this historical evolution of the concept of patrimony, the 
default rule adopted in civil law countries regulating the relations between 
debtors and creditors becomes more clear.  On one side, there is a universal 
patrimonial liability (which stems from the idea of the indivisibility of the 
patrimony) and, on the other side, there is the possibility that only property 
law allows a division through a partitioning of the patrimony itself.51 
B. The Historical Evolution of Affirmative Asset Partitioning in the 
United States 
In civil law countries, the modern concept of asset partitioning has its 
origins in the early nineteenth century.  During that period, demand 
increased for business organizations that were able to separate the firm’s 
assets from the owners’ personal assets.52  The ability to commit assets to a 
specific business purpose, without the threat of the firm’s assets being 
liquidated either by an owner or his personal creditors, was regarded as a 
fundamental attribute for businesses of substantial dimensions.53 
 
 49. Id. at 665-80; NICOLA COVIELLO, MANUALE DI DIRITTO CIVILE ITALIANO:  PARTE 
GENERALE 252 (4th ed. 1929). 
 50. FERRARA, supra note 24, at 875. 
 51. It would be useful to read Art. 2645 of the Civil Code of Québec once again, in light 
of what has just been described:  “Any person under a personal obligation charges, for its 
performance, all his property, movable and immovable, present and future, except property . 
. . which is the object of a division of patrimony permitted by law.” 
 52. See Blair, supra note 5, at 413 (describing efforts in the nineteenth century to 
strengthen business institutions through the creation of joint stock companies and specially 
chartered corporations). 
 53. The restriction on the ability of a firm’s owners “to force the payout of an owner’s 
share of the firm’s net assets” has been referred to by some authors as “liquidation 
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In the nineteenth century, before corporate charters were issued on a 
widespread basis in the U.S., attempts to achieve affirmative asset 
partitioning were made where there was a compelling necessity to gather 
significant capital assets.  In the seventeenth century, two key 
developments in this direction occurred in England:  1) in 1683, the 
Chancery Court ruled that partnership creditors enjoy priority over 
partners’ personal creditors in the event of a bankrupt partnership (weak 
affirmative asset partitioning);54 and 2) the English Crown began granting 
charters to joint stock companies in order to assure an existence longer than 
a single trade mission for these companies.55  To compensate the 
restrictions on merchants to withdraw their capital at the end of each 
voyage, the right to sell shares of the company without the consent of other 
owners was introduced.56 
In the eighteenth century, because the English Parliament only granted 
a limited number of charters, merchants and other business people tried to 
achieve affirmative asset partitioning through partnership and trust law.  
The unincorporated joint stock company became the entity used by 
merchants to accomplish both affirmative asset partitioning and share 
tradability.57  The latter was achieved through complex contract clauses and 
the former by placing the assets into a trust.58  Only in 1844 did the English 
Parliament enact a statute admitting incorporation as a general right.59 
In the first half of the nineteenth century in the U.S., incorporation 
was still restricted to a fixed range of business purposes.  In order to 
achieve affirmative asset partitioning, business people used unincorporated 
joint stock companies together with trust law.60  Despite the fact that many 
states passed general incorporation statutes during this time period, in the 
early twentieth century, the use of the trust—in particular, the business trust 
(also known as the Massachusetts trust)—was a strong competitor to the 
corporation in this regard.61 
 
protection.”  Hansmann, Kraakman & Squire, supra note 9, at 1338 (citing Hansmann & 
Kraakman, supra note 2, at 403-04).  This method has also been referred to as “locking in 
capital.”  Blair, supra note 5, at 387. 
 54. Hansmann, Kraakman & Squire, supra note 9, at 1381 (citing (1683) 21 Eng. Rep. 
664 (ch.)). 
 55. Id. at 1376-77. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Hansmann, Kraakman & Squire, supra note 9, at 1383-84. 
 58. Blair, supra note 5, at 414–16; Hansmann, Kraakman & Squire, supra note 9, at 
1383.  Merchant law has been viewed as “an excellent place to look for voluntary solutions 
to asset partitioning problems . . . .”  Mahoney, supra note 5, at 880. 
 59. Hansmann, Kraakman & Squire, supra note 9, at 1386. 
 60. Blair, supra note 5, at 414. 
 61. “Trust’s salience as a form of business organization during this era explains why 
today we have antitrust law, not competition or monopoly law, as it is known abroad.”  
Robert H. Sitkoff, Trust as “Uncorporation”:  A Research Agenda, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 31, 
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The use of trust law represents a boundary between common law and 
civil law traditions on affirmative asset partitioning and explains the 
differences in the evolution of this doctrine.  The existence of the trust 
device facilitated the acceptance of the “asset independence” principle in 
the common law tradition.  In the civil law countries, on the other hand, a 
complicated doctrinal debate was required in order to establish the practice 
of partitioning the same patrimony in multiple and separate pools of assets.  
Intuitively, it is easier to conceive of asset partitioning when it is achieved 
through transfers of assets to a different entity (e.g., the trust), than when it 
is accomplished within the same patrimony. 
The rise of the corporate form as a general device to achieve asset 
partitioning has been a subject of great interest to many American scholars.  
However, some have neglected to explain why, in operating enterprises, 
corporations have prevailed over statutory business trusts that are used only 
in specific cases, such as mutual funds and structured finance.62 
The history of asset partitioning and the differences between the 
common law and civil law systems in this area set the framework for 
understanding why these two legal systems employ different devices in 
important business transactions where affirmative asset partitioning is 
required. 
V. AFFIRMATIVE ASSET PARTITIONING AND “ASSET INDEPENDENCE”:  A 
FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS 
As explained above, while in the U.S. scholars consider affirmative 
asset partitioning to represent one—and, according to the most recent 
studies, the most significant—characteristic of a juridical person63 (together 
with limited liability, perpetual life, centralized management and free 
tradability of shares), in civil law countries there is a clear distinction 
between the concepts of “asset independence” (which can be likened to the 
concept of affirmative asset partitioning) and the juridical person. 
 
32 (2005). 
 62. Id. at 42–44.  While there are benefits to some of the empirical data already 
discovered, there are overarching concerns.  In particular, when discussing the success of 
corporations relative to trusts by only highlighting the fact that in the twentieth century 
regulatory limits in state corporate codes disappeared, there is a presumption of  superiority 
of the corporate form in the absence of any real explanation. 
 63. John Armour & Michael J. Whincop, The Proprietary Foundations of Corporate 
Law, 27 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 429 (2007); Margaret M. Blair, Locking in Capital:  What 
Corporate Law Achieved for Business Organizers in the Nineteenth Century, 51 UCLA L. 
REV. 387 (2003); Edward M. Iacobucci & George G. Triantis, Economic and Legal 
Boundaries of Firms, 93 VA. L. REV. 515 (2007); Paul G. Mahoney, Contract or 
Concession? An Essay on the History of Corporate Law, 34 GA. L. REV. 873 (2000); Lynn 
A. Stout, On the Nature of Corporations, U. ILL. L. REV. 253 (2005). 
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This distinction has practical consequences, and is not merely 
semantic.  A comparative analysis of different asset partitioning devices is 
conducted in this section in order to understand the economics of 
affirmative asset partitioning through the use of a new legal entity, as 
opposed to doing so through a property law granting “asset independence” 
within the boundaries of the same entity. 
A. The “Funds Committed to a Specific Purpose” of the Italian Civil 
Code v. a Corporate Subsidiary 
1. Preliminary Considerations 
In a recent study, Edward M. Iacobucci and George C. Triantis 
presented a general capital-structure theory for the legal partitioning of 
assets.  They explored when it is more efficient to partition assets into 
distinct organizations and achieve the efficiency gains that result from 
tailoring as compared to cases where it is more efficient to group assets 
within a single entity to benefit from the economies deriving from 
integration.  In keeping with the affirmative asset partitioning doctrine, the 
analysis is conducted based on the assumption that a debt is always a firm-
wide obligation and that partitioning can be achieved only through the 
formation of multiple legal entities.64 
According to this logic, since it is not possible to accomplish a 
partitioning of assets within the same entity, there is a consequential trade-
off between the efficiency gains that result from asset partitioning and the 
economies that derive from integration into a single entity.  This conclusion 
does not appear to be necessarily true in a civil law country where the 
foundational legal principle of this analysis has been disproven. 
The “asset independence” doctrine allows a legal subject to partition 
its assets within its own boundaries, enabling a firm to limit its obligation 
to a subset of its assets without having to form a new legal entity.  Thus, a 
firm could avoid the trade-off described by Iacobucci and Triantis by 
 
 64. In particular, Iacobucci & Triantis, supra note 5, assume that a subdivision of a 
person may not own property: 
[A] corporation is a legal person that may own property, but a division or 
branch of the corporation may not. . . . Although the corporation itself might 
enter into a contract that attempts to limit its exposure to only a subset of its 
assets, we show that such segmentation is difficult to achieve under current law. 
. . . To fully match groups of assets with appropriate financing and governance 
features, an entrepreneur . . . must partition the groups into distinct entities. . . . 
The practical consequence of legal restrictions on asset-specific financing is that 
entrepreneurs and managers seeking to tailor financial and governance rights to 
different asset types must do so outside corporate boundaries by partitioning 
assets among multiple firms.  Id. at 518–20. 
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simultaneously achieving the benefits of partitioning and maintaining the 
economies of integration. 
2. The Italian “Committed Funds” 
The clearest example of this approach is the regulation of the “funds 
committed to a specific purpose” introduced in 2003 into the Italian Civil 
Code by arts. 2447 bis - 2447 decies.65 
This set of rules provides that a corporation may partition up to 10 
percent of its assets in order to commit it to a specific business purpose.  
This separate fund is pledged only to those creditors whose claim is related 
to the specific purpose (“specialized creditors”), while the “general  
creditors” have no recourse against these assets (affirmative asset 
partitioning).  Meanwhile, the firm’s assets that are not committed to the 
specific business purpose and are not part of the committed fund are 
protected from each group of specialized creditors (defensive asset 
partitioning).66 
Through a property law which is “good against the world,”67 the 
Italian Civil Code allows a corporation to partition its assets into different 
pools (a general one, and one or more that are committed to a specific 
purpose) and to distinguish its creditors in different categories (“general 
creditors” and “specialized creditors”) without creating a new legal entity 
(e.g., a corporate subsidiary).68 
The correct way of analyzing this legal device, imposed by the Italian 
Civil Code, from a cost and benefit perspective is to make a comparison 
with its closest functional equivalent:  the corporate subsidiary.  In 
particular, there is significance in exploring differences, if any, between 
achieving the affirmative asset partitioning within the boundaries of the 
same entity (committed funds) and achieving the partitioning through the 
formation of a new legal entity (corporate subsidiary). 
 
 65. C.C. art. 2447 bis–2447 decies. 
 66. The asset partitioning effect is regulated by C.c. art. 2447 quinquies. 
 67. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, What Happened To Property In 
Law And Economics, 111 YALE L.J. 357, 358 (2001). 
 68. This legal device has captured the attention of several corporate scholars in Italy.  
Among the many authors on this subject, see Andrea Zoppini, Autonomia e separazione del 
patrimonio, nella prospettiva dei patrimoni separati della società per azioni, 48 RIVISTA DI 
DIRITTO CIVILE 545 (2002) (comparing the partitioning of assets with the effects of 
incorporation), Gianvito Giannelli, Commentary, Artt. 2447 bis - 2447 decies c.c., in 2 
SOCIETÀ DI CAPITALI:  COMMENTARIO 1210 (Giuseppe Niccolini & Alberto Stagno 
d’Alcontres eds. 2004) (distinguishing committed funds from other types of asset divisions). 
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3. Lower Monitoring Costs 
Both the committed fund and corporate subsidiary are able to pledge 
separate pools of assets to specific lines of business.  In both cases, 
affirmative asset partitioning enables a corporation to group its creditors 
into distinct categories, defined only by those assets committed to a 
specific line of business.  Since each group of creditors is not concerned 
with the success of other lines of business and is instead exploiting its 
monitoring specialties, a lower cost of credit is achieved.69 
4. Matching Capital Structure and Asset Type 
The possibility of moving assets into a separate pool or into a 
corporate subsidiary facilitates a better match between capital structure and 
the nature of the assets.  If two asset groups differ in certain aspects, 
corporate finance literature has argued that it is efficient to locate these 
assets in distinct corporations so that the optimal capital structure between 
debt financing and equity financing can be achieved.70  Since regulation of 
committed funds provides that the corporation can issue different securities 
for each fund (i.e., securities that are only attached to the specific assets 
committed to the fund), in the Italian legal system it seems plausible to 
argue that an optimal capital structure can be achieved without the 
formation of different legal entities.71 
5. Agency Costs 
Integrating several lines of business into a unitary entity poses a 
managerial agency cost.  In an internal market, managers “may allocate 
resources so as to enhance their private benefits rather than overall 
profitability.”72  To limit opportunistic behavior by management, the 
 
 69. This topic has been discussed in various articles. See, e.g., Hansmann & Kraakman, 
supra note 1, at 399-401 (exploring the advantages of sub-partitioning assets and lines of 
business within a company by creating corporate subsidiaries); Hansmann, Kraakman & 
Squire, supra note 9, at 1344-45 (using a hypothetical situation to demonstrate how entity 
shielding may reduce monitoring costs incurred by creditors). 
 70. Iacobucci & Triantis, supra note 5, at 523, 544. 
 71. The majority interpretation of the Italian Civil Code art. 2447-ter (e), which allows 
a corporation to issue asset-specific securities, argues that a corporation can issue common 
stocks that attach to the committed fund’s assets, debt securities and hybrid securities.  See 
Carlo Comporti, Commento all’ articolo 2447 ter Cod. civ., in 2 LA RIFORMA DELLE 
SOCIETÀ 973-975 (Michele Sandulli & Vittorio Santoro eds. 2003). 
 72. Iacobucci & Triantis, supra note 5, at 562.  See also George G. Triantis, 
Organizations as Internal Capital Markets:  The Legal Boundaries of Firms, Collateral, 
and Trusts in Commercial and Charitable Enterprises, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1102, 1123-26 
(2004) (exploring the effects and corporate boundaries related to the control of liquidity 
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formation of a corporate subsidiary has been proposed as a possible 
solution.73  While in a single corporation a director’s decisions are 
protected by the business judgment rule in order to make it more difficult to 
second-guess transfers of assets between different lines of business, in a 
parent-subsidiary structure, minority shareholders can challenge such 
transfers by designating them as related-party transactions which need to be 
intrinsically fair.  Where the parent wholly owns the subsidiary such that 
there are no minority shareholders, creditors of that subsidiary can, through 
covenants, restrict the shifting of capital between the two entities.74 
Even if the partitioning of assets between two entities reduces the risk 
of opportunistic behavior, a parent-subsidiary structure or a group of 
subsidiaries under common control will not be able to completely eliminate 
managerial agency costs. 
At first glance, the committed funds device creates a greater risk for 
opportunistic asset shifting since the fund is managed by the same directors 
as the corporation.  However, a fundamental aspect of this legal device is 
that the assets of committed funds must be registered in public records as 
being bound to a specific purpose.75  If real property is committed to a 
separate fund, the fund’s specific purpose must be registered in the same 
public record where the real property is registered.76  With regard to 
personal property, the resolution constituting the committed fund must 
report all assets that are part of the fund and the resolution must be 
registered in the same public record where the corporation is recorded.77  
Since the commitment to a specific purpose is made public (i.e., “good 
against the world”), any use of the committed assets contrary to the specific 
purpose (i.e., ultra vires) is considered void.78  Thus, the committed funds 
device appears to be a more effective solution to the managerial agency 
problem than the formation of a corporate subsidiary.79 
 
within a corporation). 
 73. Iacobucci & Triantis, supra note 5, at 561. 
 74. Iacobucci & Triantis, supra note 5, at 563. 
 75. C.C. art. 2447 quinquies, co. 2 (It.). 
 76. See id. (stating that “[t]he resolution must be deposited and filed according to art. 
2436 c.c.,” which provides that the notary overviewing the resolution must file the 
resolution in the firm’s public record). 
 77. See C.C. art. 2447 ter (b) and 2447 quater co. 1 (It.) 
 78. Giannelli, supra note 68, at 1243-46. 
 79. Hansmann, Kraakman & Squire, supra note 9, at 1346.  In an internal market, 
managers could be tempted to borrow too much since they can bond the assets of the whole 
entity.  Asset partitioning reduces this risk, since managers will be able to borrow only 
against the assets of the separate entity.  With regard to this agency problem, corporate 
subsidiaries and committed funds appear to be perfectly equivalent solutions. 
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6. Value of Switching Options and Hold-Up Problem 
Resolving the management agency cost associated with asset shifting 
imposes an inversely correlated cost where once a pool of assets has been 
allocated to a separate legal entity it becomes costly to reallocate capital 
among different projects.  The reason is that, while managers of a single 
entity can readily redeploy capital by authority, two separate entities must 
enter into a contract and bear the transaction costs of moving capital 
between projects. 
Both the corporate subsidiary and committed funds reduce the value 
of “switching options.”  However, this value is enhanced when the 
managers are free to switch capital between ventures.80  With a corporate 
subsidiary format the two legal entities have to enter into a contract to 
capture the surplus generated by their synergy, but managers of committed 
funds do not have such a requirement.  Managers of corporate subsidiaries, 
though, may not redeploy assets when the new use is inconsistent with the 
purpose originally pursued by the funds. 
In both cases, it is plausible that some stakeholders will make the 
opportunistic attempt to hold-up the transaction over the surplus generated 
by the synergy.81  In the case of the parent subsidiary structure, the minority 
shareholders can threaten the parent company with a challenge to the 
contract as a related-party transaction.82  Creditors of a committed funds 
structure can threaten to challenge the decision of the management as one 
contrary to the specific purpose of the fund.83  Unlike a committed fund, a 
wholly-owned subsidiary is not able to overcome these costs of 
partitioning.84  “If a parent attempts to strengthen, ex ante, its control over a 
subsidiary in order to avoid transaction costs and hold-up activity, it invites 
judicial veil piercing or enterprise liability under state corporate law or 
substantive consolidation in bankruptcy.”85 
7. Tracking of Value 
Securities rights are attached to all of a corporation’s property, not to 
specific assets.86  In order to track the progress of a particular asset, 
corporations can issue tracking stocks that try to reflect the asset’s value.87 
 
 80. Iacobucci & Triantis, supra note 5, at 521-23, 561-63; Triantis, supra note 72, at 
1105-06. 
 81. Iacobucci & Triantis, supra note 5, at 561-63. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. at 563. 
 86. Id. at 535. 
 87. Id. at 536-37. 
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The effectiveness of tracking stocks is limited by two factors:  1) the 
inability of directors to “announce a dividend payable out of the profits of a 
single division if the firm as a whole has failed to meet the statutory 
threshold” (a minimum capital surplus); and 2) the inability to link a 
tracking stock’s dissolution rights to the tracked assets rather than to the 
value of the entire firm.88 
To overcome these limitations, a corporation can establish a distinct 
legal entity to oversee a specific line of business.  In such a case, securities 
rights are attached only to assets related to the specific business venture.89 
Committed funds enable firms to overcome the limitations of tracking 
stocks by permitting the firms to issue asset-specific securities.  As a result, 
dividends are payable only by considering the profits of the separate fund, 
and upon dissolution, the stockholders of the asset-specific securities 
receive a fraction of the value of the fund without sharing the losses 
suffered by the general patrimony of the firm.90  Therefore, the residual 
claims of asset-specific stockholders are linked only to the assets of the 
tracked fund.  This legal device enables a corporation to achieve the benefit 
of partitioning without the costs of establishing a new legal entity. 
8. The Asset Partitioning Effect 
As explained earlier, both a committed fund and a corporate 
subsidiary can accomplish affirmative asset partitioning.  While the 
subsidiary achieves what has been called “strong entity shielding,” the 
committed fund accomplishes what has been called “complete entity 
shielding.”91 
Strong entity shielding restricts the ability of both shareholders and 
their personal creditors to seize the assets of the corporation.92  However, 
the shares of a corporate subsidiary also represent an asset of the parent 
corporation.  This creates a paradoxical situation where, on the one hand, 
creditors cannot seize the subsidiary’s assets, but on the other hand, 
creditors can still seize the shares of the subsidiary and, if the seized shares 
constitute the majority, the creditors can force the subsidiary’s liquidation. 
In contrast, a committed fund creates an effective wall between the 
corporation’s general creditors (corresponding to the parent corporation’s 
creditors) and the assets transferred into the fund.  The corporation does not 
own any share representing the fund so any claim to those assets is 
 
 88. Id. at 535-37. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. See Hansmann, Kraakman & Squire, supra note 9, at 1337-38 (stating that the 
phrase “entity shielding” is the equivalent of affirmative asset partitioning). 
 92. Id. 
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denied.93  At the same time, asset partitioning through committed funds 
resembles that which is achieved in the U.S. through a trust.  Thus, the 
relative costs and benefits of this solution are debatable. 
9. Informational Economies 
Partitioning allows firms to attract investors with specialized expertise 
in particular assets.  Segregating these investors’ assets from the rest of the 
patrimony lowers investigation and monitoring costs.94  Similarly, some 
investors may wish to invest in multiple groups of assets.  Integrating these 
assets into the same entity has the advantage of creating information 
economies of scale.  Investors dealing with a single entity only need to 
investigate the structure of one board of directors, one set of takeover 
defenses, and one corporate governance structure.95 
In a system that conceives affirmative asset partitioning only through 
the formation of a new legal entity, there is a trade-off between the costs 
avoided through asset partitioning (lower monitoring costs for specialized 
creditors) and the benefits achieved through legal integration (information 
economies of scale).  The use of committed funds can overcome this trade-
off.  Committed funds allow a corporation to attract investors with 
specialized expertise who are willing to invest in particular assets bound to 
a specific purpose.  At the same time, maintaining the corporation’s unity 
creates information economies of scale and attracts those investors seeking 
the benefits of diversification. 
B. Asset Securitization 
1. Overview of Asset Securitization 
 
In a typical asset securitization transaction, a corporation (the 
originator) transfers some of its assets (normally the receivables) to a 
distinct legal entity (the special purpose vehicle or SPV)that is either a new 
corporation or a trust.96  The SPV issues securities backed by the 
receivables and uses the raised capital to pay the originator the price of the 
receivables.97 
Through such a transaction, the originator is able to separate the risk 
associated with its general activity from the risk associated with the 
 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. at 1344-45. 
 95. Id. at 1343-48. 
 96. Steven L. Schwarcz, The Alchemy of Asset Securitization, 1 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 
133, 135-36 (1994). 
 97. Id. 
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receivables.98  Since the receivables are transferred to the SPV, investors 
are concerned only with the securitized assets and not with the general 
financial condition of the originator.99  Asset securitization accomplishes an 
asset partitioning which is affirmative and defensive.  The originator’s 
creditors have no claims against the receivables that have been sold to a 
third party and pledged to the exclusive satisfaction of the investors 
(affirmative asset partitioning).100  The investors, meanwhile, as creditors of 
the SPV, cannot seize any assets of the originator (defensive asset 
partitioning).101 
The partitioning of assets between two distinct legal entities also 
enables the originator to lower the cost of credit.  Since the SPV, also 
called a “bankruptcy remote” vehicle, is unaffected by the originator’s 
incidental bankruptcy, investors are willing to pay a higher price for 
securitized assets.102 
In light of the discussion above, it is not surprising that, in the United 
States, asset securitization accomplishes partitioning through the formation 
of a new legal entity.103  The originator often creates a separate entity 
(either a corporation or a trust) for each securitization transaction to avoid 
co-mingling asset pools related to different transactions.  The logic of 
achieving asset partitioning through duplication of legal entities is therefore 
corroborated.104 
2. Asset Securitization in Italy 
The regulation of asset securitization in Italy offers another example 
of the “asset independence” doctrine or, put differently, an affirmative asset 
partitioning achieved within the boundaries of the same entity. 
Law No. 130 of April 30, 1999 provides two different possibilities for 
achieving asset securitization.  The first possibility is reminiscent of the 
scheme described above with regard to the United States, and it is 
accomplished through the formation of an SPV, typically as a new 
corporation.105  The second possibility allows a corporation to perform an 
 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. For a discussion on “affirmative asset partitioning,” see Hansmann & Kraakman, 
supra note 2, at 394-95. 
 101. “For a discussion on “defensive asset partitioning,” see Hansmann & Kraakman, 
supra note 2, at 395-96.” 
 102. Henry Hansmann & Ugo Mattei, The Functions of Trust Law:  a Comparative 
Legal and Economic Analysis, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 434, 468 (1998). 
 103. See Schwarcz, supra note 96, at 136–144 (examining the structure and benefits of 
asset securitization). 
 104. Id. 
 105. Law No. 130 of April 30, 1999, art. 3. 
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asset securitization, then transfer the receivables to a mutual fund.106 
With regard to the first scheme, Italian regulation provides for 
different levels of asset partitioning.  First, the SPV, a new legal entity, 
creates segregation between the general assets of the originator and the 
securitized assets.  Second, and more significantly, a property law provides 
for two additional levels of partitioning:  1) between the incidental personal 
assets of the SPV and the receivables (“vertical partitioning”);107 and 2) 
between different pools of securitized assets, each related to different 
transactions (“horizontal partitioning”).108 
In Italy, the SPV is normally organized as a corporation.  In addition 
to the securitized property, the special entity owns the legal capital required 
by law.  Having its own patrimony in addition to the pool of securitized 
assets implies that an SPV engages in a managing activity and undertakes 
obligations with third parties different from the securities holders.  As 
described above, a property law is intended to insulate the securitized 
assets of the SPV from its personal creditors, thereby departing from the 
principle that a debt is necessarily a firm-wide obligation and that 
partitioning can be achieved only through the formation of multiple legal 
entities. 
The law grants segregation not only between the SPV assets and 
receivables, but also between different pools of securitized assets that are 
held by the same SPV but related to different transactions.  The segregation 
between these asset pools is thus achieved within the boundaries of a single 
SPV, avoiding the creation of multiple legal entities. 
3. Asset Securitization in the United States 
In the United States, in order to avoid the SPV’s pledging the 
securitized property to bond obligations different from the ones undertaken 
with securities holders, its business purpose is limited to owning and 
operating the pool of securitized assets; no new property may be acquired.  
Furthermore, the SPV is prevented from incurring additional debt. 
In the United States, to reinforce the segregation between claims by 
different categories of creditors, it is common to organize the SPV in the 
form of a trust.109  The receivables are committed to the trust fund, and they 
 
 106. Id., art. 7, ¶ 1. 
 107. Id., art. 3, ¶ 2. 
 108. Id.  Whether these pools were commingled in a single patrimony, investors with 
different degrees of risk would be exposed to the outcomes of others’ portfolios.  Without a 
property law that grants horizontal partitioning, an originator would need to create a new 
SPV for each asset securitization transaction. 
 109. See, e.g., David Hayton, The Uses of Trusts in the Commercial Context, in MODERN 
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS IN TRUST LAW 145 (1999) (discussing the various uses of 
trusts to protect assets). 
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are consequently insulated from claims of the settlor (the originator) and 
claims of the trustee’s (the SPV’s) personal creditors.  While the 
originator’s personal creditors cannot seize the trust fund because it is 
owned by a third party (the trustee),110 in the common law of trusts, if the 
trustee becomes insolvent, the trust property he or she administers is 
unavailable to satisfy the trustee’s obligations to his or her personal 
creditors.111 
4. The Case of Multiple Transactions 
As mentioned above, the Italian legal system provides that, in the case 
of multiple asset securitization transactions, the same entity can hold 
different and separate pools of assets.  A property law ensures that each 
pool of receivables is committed only to the corresponding group of 
securities holders. 
It is important to distinguish the case of multiple, separate, and 
unrelated transactions under one SPV from the multiple issue of certificates 
under the master trust that is common practice in the United States.  In the 
latter case, when a corporation or a financial institution has a substantial 
amount of receivables that belong to the same category, and are therefore 
difficult to separate in order to obtain a different rating, a practical solution 
is for the corporation to transfer these receivables to a master trust (an 
SPV).  This trust will then issue different classes of trust certificates at 
different points in time.  Each class of certificates can be fashioned in a 
distinct way, with different substantive rights (e.g., different interest rates) 
and diversified subordination rights.112 
Even though a series of covenants and subordination agreements are 
designed to keep each class of certificates separate, it must be stressed that 
each debt assumed by the master trust is a firm-wide obligation; that is, all 
the receivables of the trust fund are the common pledge of all investors.  
 
 110. This is true to the extent that the substantive consolidation doctrine does not apply 
in the event of the originator’s bankruptcy.  According to this doctrine, all assets and 
liabilities of two different entities are consolidated as if they were one entity.  As a 
consequence, the originator’s personal creditors can seize the receivables transferred to the 
SPV.  This doctrine applies after the court’s consideration of several factors including:  (1) 
presence or absence of consolidated financial statements; (2) unity of interests and 
ownership between the various corporate entities; (3) existence of parent and inter-corporate 
guarantees on loans; (4) degree of difficulty in segregating and ascertaining individual assets 
and liability; (5) existence of transfers of assets without the observance of corporate 
formalities; (6) commingling of assets and business functions; and (7) profitability of 
consolidation at a single physical location.  In re Vecco Construction Industries, Inc., 4 B.R. 
407, 410 [Bankr. E.D. Va. 1980]. 
 111. Hansmann & Mattei, supra note 21, at 141. 
 112. See STEVEN L. SCHWARCZ & ADAM D. FORD, STRUCTURED FINANCE:  A GUIDE TO 
THE PRINCIPLES OF ASSET SECURITIZATION, 3.18 (3rd. ed. 2003) (explaining the master trust). 
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Therefore, each claim is backed by the same pool of receivables.  It is true 
that a junior investor only has recourse against the pool of assets that 
remains after senior creditors have been fully paid.  Since all receivables 
are in the same pool of assets, if the trustee breaches a covenant or does not 
respect the seniority of one class of certificates, senior investors will have 
only contractual remedies at their disposal. 
To be sure that each class of investors is completely shielded by the 
others’ claims, the SPV must hold wholly separate pools of assets 
containing separate classes of securities for each pool.  Under the same 
SPV, multiple transactions must be structured so that securities backed by 
one pool do not have rights to other pools.  This outcome would be 
especially complicated were there not a statutory rule to enable asset 
partitioning within the boundaries of the same entity.113  In the absence of a 
property law ensuring that different pools of assets under one entity are 
kept wholly separate, it would be necessary for an SPV to negotiate a 
waiver with each investor to seize the assets of a pool backing a separate 
class of securities.  Making certain that each investor accepts this waiver 
would not only raise transaction costs, but would simultaneously impose 
higher monitoring costs on other investors, since the contractual nature of 
such an agreement exposes it to moral hazard and potential breaches. 
The practical response to these difficulties of realizing separate and 
unrelated transactions under one issuing entity is to create multiple issuing 
entities, each related to a different category of investors.  Once again, the 
common law experience seems to confirm the general principle that distinct 
pools of assets are conceivable only as separate legal entities. 
5. Cost and Benefit Comparison of the Two Systems 
Describing the differences between the Italian and American legal 
systems with regard to asset securitization is not only a theoretical exercise, 
but reveals different functional outcomes. 
The possibility of an SPV’s holding multiple and wholly separate 
pools of assets, each backing a different asset securitization transaction, has 
been identified by representatives of U.S. issuers as a way to reduce the 
costs of creating multiple issuing entities.114  On the other hand, the lack of 
 
 113. On this reasoning, see supra Part II. 
 114. Practicing Law Institute, Tax Classification of Segregated Portfolio Companies, 
869 PLI/Tax 381, 390-91 (May-June 2009). 
It often happens that an investment bank or other sponsor wishes to create, for 
sale to investors, debt or equity securities that are backed by identified assets.  
For repeat business with various asset pools and investors, it is cheaper, easier 
and quicker to use as the securities issuer segregated portfolios within a single 
company rather than multiple companies.  Companies need to be formed and 
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a property law in the United States that would grant an affirmative asset 
partitioning within the same entity imposes this result only through a 
complex series of covenants and subordination agreements.  Consequently, 
it seems reasonable to conclude that the transaction costs of managing 
multiple asset securitization transactions within one SPV outweigh the 
benefits of not having to create multiple issuing entities.115 
As described above, the Italian legal system provides that an SPV can 
hold multiple, wholly separate pools of assets backing different asset 
securitization transactions.  Article 3, paragraph 2 of Law No. 130 of April 
30, 1999 provides that each pool of assets is segregated from both the 
SPV’s legal capital required by law and from other pools committed to a 
different asset securitization transaction. 
This law means that each investor, in the absence of his previous 
consent, has limited recourse against the pool of assets corresponding to his 
transaction; therefore, he is banned from seizing either assets of the 
corporation’s patrimony (normally corresponding to the minimum legal 
capital required by law) or assets committed to different categories of 
investors.  Essentially, this property law reduces the transaction costs of 
asset partitioning compared with the partitioning achieved either through a 
complex series of waivers, covenants and subordination agreements, or by 
multiplying legal entities. 
Nonetheless, this legal structure is not free of risk.  As is the case in 
the United States, the SPV’s business purpose is limited to operating the 
pool of securitized assets.116  Unlike the United States, however, its 
patrimony is not limited to securitized assets; in fact, each SPV is 
compelled to own the minimum legal capital required by law.  Therefore, it 
will be engaged not only in asset securitization transactions but, at the same 
 
cared for.  They must have a board of directors or managers and stockholder or 
member meetings.  It is better to form a company once rather than 100 times if 
there is a commercial desire to create 100 series of securities backed by distinct 
asset pools.  Id. 
 115. See PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE, NUTS & BOLTS OF FINANCIAL PRODUCTS:  
UNDERSTANDING THE EVOLVING WORLD OF CAPITAL MARKET & INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT 
PRODUCTS 115 (2007) 
[T]he more fundamental issue with the use of multiple, separate and unrelated 
transactions under one issuing entity for asset-backed securities is that it raises 
concerns that deviate from the core principle that investors of a particular asset-
backed security should look solely to the related pool of assets for primary 
repayment.  With a series trust structure, instead of only analyzing the particular 
pool, an investor also may need to analyze any effect on its security, including 
bankruptcy remoteness issues, if problems were to arise in another wholly 
separate and unrelated transaction in the same issuing entity.  These concerns 
are exacerbated if new unrelated transactions are created after the original 
transaction involving the investor. 
 116. Law No. 130 of April 30, 1999, art. 3, ¶ 1. 
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time, in managing its own patrimony.  The latter activity implies the 
possibility of undertaking obligations with third parties, and therefore also 
involves reducing the bankruptcy remoteness of these entities. 
Even if the property law described above successfully segregates the 
corporation’s patrimony from the other pools of assets, the managerial 
activity of this patrimony increases the risk of commingling different funds, 
as well as the chance of default.117  On this point, the U.S. approach seems 
to lower the risks of commingling and defaulting.  In fact, especially when 
the SPV is structured as a trust, trust law ensures that trust property is 
unavailable to satisfy the trustee's obligations to his personal creditors.  
Furthermore, the fact that the trust is limited not only in its business 
purpose but also in the sense of owning only the securitized assets reduces 
the risk of undertaking and defaulting on obligations with third parties.118 
Asset securitization represents another example of the dichotomy 
between common law and civil law countries regarding asset partitioning.  
The alternative between performing multiple but separate asset 
securitization transactions either through the formation of multiple legal 
entities or within the boundaries of the same SPV leads to contradictory 
outcomes.  While on one hand Italian regulation lowers the transaction 
costs of this partitioning, on the other hand, managing multiple pools of 
assets together with the SPV’s legal capital increases the risk of eliminating 
the bankruptcy remoteness quality of the vehicle. 
C. Mutual Funds 
1. Overview of Mutual Funds 
Another set of legal instruments that deserve special attention from 
any research comparing asset partitioning devices are mutual funds.  These 
 
 117. Clementina Scaroni, Il patrimonio separato della società veicolo per la 
cartolarizzazione dei crediti, in CONTRATTO E IMPRESA 1075, 1084, n. 25 (2005); Francesco 
Di Ciommo, La securitization tra diritto ed economia, tra normativa nazionale e modelli 
stranieri, in LA CARTOLARIZZAZIONE DEI CREDITI IN ITALIA 1, 99 (Roberto Pardolesi ed., 
1999) (noting that, in Italy, unlike in the United States, a Special Purpose Vehicle can 
continue to operate as a corporation, possibly outside of its original scope). 
 118. Some attention has been devoted to verifying the difference between creating an 
SPV as a corporation or as a trust. See John H. Langbein, The Secret Life of the Trust:  The 
Trust as an Instrument of Commerce, 107 YALE L.J. 165, 182 (1997) (discussing the potent 
fiduciary duties that inhere in trust law); Hansmann & Mattei, supra note 100, at 468-69 
(outlining the benefits of trusts over corporations in partitioning assets); Steven L. 
Schwarcz, Commercial Trust as Business Organizations:  Unraveling the Mystery, 58 BUS. 
L. 559, 582-83 (2003) (describing the clarity corporations law provides regarding 
bankruptcy remoteness and the benefits of trust law where bankruptcy remoteness is not a 
concern). 
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entities are very different from the ones analyzed so far.  In a corporate 
subsidiary or asset securitization, asset partitioning is used to segregate 
different risks and to attract specialized investment at a lower cost of 
credit.119  The purpose of a mutual or pension fund is essentially to serve as 
a mediating device between an investor and securities secondary markets.  
To this end, investors transfer some of their assets to an intermediary that 
becomes the manager of the fund. 
One fundamental priority for investors is to shield the managed assets 
from claims of the manager’s personal creditors (vertical partitioning).120  In 
the U.S., a trust is one of the two devices used to manage a mutual fund 
(along with the corporation), and is considered by ERISA to be mandatory 
for managing a pension fund.121  Unlike other legal entities, a trust is able to 
assure that the fund’s assets are shielded from claims of the manager’s 
personal creditors.122  It is a well established rule that “although a trustee 
becomes insolvent or bankrupt, the beneficiary retains his interest in the 
subject matter of the trust and, accordingly, the beneficiary is entitled [to 
retain that interest] as against the general creditors of the trustee.”123 
It is widely known that, in most European countries, a body of trust 
law has not developed.124  Nonetheless, as stated above, in a numerus 
clausus of circumstances the law admits asset partitioning through the 
“asset independence” doctrine.125  Mutual funds are included in these well-
defined circumstances. 
In Italy, there are two different types of  mutual fund regulation.  In 
the first, a fund’s assets are treated as being under joint ownership of the 
investors and are managed by a specialized third party.  Vertical 
partitioning is a direct consequence of this ownership structure; the assets 
are not owned by the manager and consequently cannot be seized by its 
personal creditors.  In the second, assets are transferred to a new entity that 
acquires the ownership and manages the fund.  In this case, investors are 
considered residual claimants of the corporation managing the fund, and no 
vertical partitioning is granted.126 
 
 119. See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 2, at 401 (explaining how asset partitioning 
can lower credit costs). 
 120. Id. at 398. 
 121. Hansmann & Mattei, supra note 102, at 467. 
 122. See id. (“If it were otherwise—if, for example, a pension fund were just an 
investment account maintained by the corporation within its corporate shell—the 
employees’ pensions would always be subject to the risk of the corporation’s insolvency.”). 
 123. Langbein, supra note 118, at 179 (citing the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 
12 cmt. F (1959) (internal quotations omitted)). 
 124. Hansmann & Mattei, supra note 102, at 434-35. 
 125. See supra pp. 13-18. 
 126. See PAOLA IAMICELI P., UNITÀ E SEPARAZIONE DEI PATRIMONI, PADOVA 376-78 
(2003) (providing an overview of the mutual fund structure in Italy). 
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2. Mutual Series Funds in Italy 
Property laws that grant asset partitioning are not only relevant for 
shielding managed assets from claims of the manager’s personal creditors; 
they also allow a single mutual fund to be structured into several sub-funds 
in which contributions from investors are pooled separately.  Both the joint 
ownership and the new entity schemes described above enable the mutual 
fund to segregate the assets among separate portfolios.127 
Offering multiple portfolios within the same entity allows investors to 
choose the sub-fund that best matches their risk profile and to switch all or 
part of their investment from one sub-fund to another easily.  Issuing more 
than one class of shares is not sufficient to segregate different sub-funds 
fully.  In order to shield each class of investors from other classes’ risks, a 
property law is necessary. 
Without a property law granting the segregation between sub-funds, 
each class of shares would be affected by the losses suffered by another 
series.  In the law’s absence, the extent of the rights to participation in the 
capital property or distribution account would be the same for each class of 
shares, according to the general principle that each share represents a 
portion of the general capital of the entity, and not a portion of a sub-fund.  
As explained in the course of this Article, without property law enforced 
asset partitioning, any creditor or residual claimant of an entity would share 
the risks of that entity’s consolidated activity, according to the principle 
that each debt is a firm-wide obligation.  Consequently, in order to insulate 
one pool of assets from investors of a different pool (or series), it is 
necessary to establish “asset independence” statutorily.128 
In particular, the Italian regulation on mutual funds states that when a 
fund is structured as a number of sub-funds, each sub-fund is for all intents 
and purposes separate from the others.129  Accordingly, liabilities incurred 
with respect to a particular sub-fund are enforceable only against the assets 
of that fund, and not against the general patrimony of the mutual fund or 
the assets of other sub-funds (defensive asset partitioning).  On the other 
hand, liabilities incurred with respect to the general activity of the mutual 
fund are enforceable only against its general patrimony, and not against the 
assets of the sub-funds (affirmative asset partitioning).130 
 
 127. See Legisl. Decree. No. 58 of Feb. 24, 1998, art. 36, ¶ 6 and art. 43, ¶ 8 (dictating 
each group of assets must be independent). 
 128. See Lucia Picardi, Commentary, Art. 43, d.lg. 58/1998, in TESTO UNICO DELLA 
FINANZA 380, 390 (Gian Franco Campobasso ed., 2002) (clarifying that sub-funds are not 
automatically separated from the general investment portfolio). 
 129. Legisl. Decree. No. 58 of Feb. 24, 1998, art. 36, ¶ 6. 
 130. Id. 
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3. Mutual Series Funds in the United Kingdom and the United 
States 
Wholly separate investment portfolios attract diversified investors at 
lower monitoring costs because each class of investors has recourse only to 
the assets attributable to their segregated portfolio.  This beneficial 
structure can be achieved within the same mutual fund, or through a family 
of separate entities.  Absent a statutory provision granting asset 
partitioning, one might predict a preference toward creating a family of 
entities, due to the prohibitively high costs of partitioning assets through 
contracting.131 
Departing from the traditional approach of the common law system, 
which conceives asset partitioning only through the creation of a new legal 
entity, the United Kingdom has regulated the so-called Umbrella Company.  
In 1997, the Financial Services (Open-Ended Investment Companies) 
Regulations introduced the possibility for a mutual fund to issue different 
classes of shares, each linked to a separate sub-fund.132  Contributions from 
shareholders would be pooled separately, so that property and distribution 
rights of each class of investors are exclusively backed by the 
corresponding sub-fund.133 
The United Kingdom regulation reinforces the intuition that without a 
property law—a statutory rule “good against the world”—it is effectively 
impossible to achieve asset partitioning within the same entity.  The U.S. 
experience offers further confirmation of this. 
In the United States, pursuant to rule 18(f)(3) of the Investment 
Company Act of 1940, mutual funds can issue more than one class of 
shares.134  In accordance with the fundamental principle that a debt is a 
firm-wide obligation, all shareholders’ claims lie on the same investment 
portfolio.  Consequently, a multi-class structure, while facilitating the 
diversification of shares with respect to expenses and distribution, 
administration and shareholder services, does not assign different property 
and distribution rights to distinct classes of investors.135 
In order to insulate the claims and distribution rights of one class of 
 
 131. See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 2, at 406-11 (discussing the high costs of 
achieving asset partitioning through contracting). 
 132. See FINANCIAL SERVICES AUTHORITY, FINANCIAL SERVICES (OPEN-ENDED 
INVESTMENT COMPANIES) REGULATIONS, 1997, Part 11, at 87 (explaining a proposed 
umbrella company does not qualify unless each of its proposed sub-funds were a separate 
company). 
 133. Id. 
 134. 17 C.F.R. §270.18f-3 (2009). 
 135. See Laurin B. Kleiman & Carla G. Teodoro, Forming, Organizing and Operating a 
Mutual Fund—Legal and Practical Considerations, in THE ABCS OF MUTUAL FUNDS 13, 48 
(2008). 
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shares from other classes, the two typical legal forms of mutual funds,  the 
trust and the corporation, can create within their boundaries distinct funds 
having different investment objectives.136  This structure, normally named 
“mutual series funds,” aims to assign a separate pool of assets to each 
series so that each class of shares tracks only those assets.137  The ultimate 
goal of the series structure is to shield the assets of one series from claims 
arising out of, or in connection with, another series.138 
Consistent with the fundamental principle that all assets are the 
common pledge of creditors, both the common law of trusts and 
conventional corporate statutes do not provide a rule allowing assets of one 
series to be wholly insulated from creditors of another series.  Absenting a 
statutory recognition of asset partitioning, the mutual series funds structure 
requires each class to monitor the overall financial condition of the mutual 
fund.  As has been asserted in the case of multiple asset securitization 
transactions, the costs of creating fully separate sub-funds through 
contracting would seem to outweigh the benefits of avoiding the creation of 
multiple legal entities. 
4. The Delaware Series Regulation 
In order to give the series structure a statutory foundation, in 1990 the 
Delaware Business Trust Act recognized that the governing instrument of a 
trust may establish a series of trustees, beneficial interests or beneficial 
owners, which have separate rights, powers, or duties with respect to 
separate property or obligations of the statutory trust, as well as profits and 
losses associated with specific series.139  This reform indicates the 
awareness that, without a statutory rule (i.e., property law), the power to 
create a wholly separate series without investors’ consent is absent.  The 
statutory language ensures that with appropriate “records and notices” the 
debts, obligations, liabilities, and expenses associated with these particular 
series are enforceable only against that series, and not against other series 
of the trust or the trust generally.140 
 
 136. Some scholars have tried to understand why the trust structure seems to be 
dominant in comparison to the corporate structure by focusing their attention on the agency 
problem between investors and managers, and exploring the characteristics of fiduciary 
duties in trust law as compared to corporate law.  Langbein, supra note 21, 625-28; Sitkoff, 
supra note 61, at 37-38; Schwarcz, supra note 118, at 573-81. Compare Hansmann & 
Mattei, supra note 102, at 469-72 (pointing out the proprietary characteristics of trust law). 
 137. See Practicing Law Institute, supra note 114, at 412-14. 
 138. Id. 
 139. DEL.CODE. ANN. tit. 12, § 3806(b)(1)(2) (2009). 
 140. See Ann E. Conaway, A Business Review of the Delaware Series:  Good Business 
for the Informed, in WHAT ALL BUSINESS LAWYERS MUST KNOW ABOUT DELAWARE LAW 
DEVELOPMENTS 647, 653 (2008). 
ELGUETAFINALIZED_SIX 3/31/2010  2:04:51 AM 
550 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 12:2 
 
It is worth noting that, even if the series structure were conceived to 
allow a single mutual fund to operate different investment portfolios under 
a centralized board of directors and a single registration as required by the 
Investment Company Act of 1940, this reform has expanded the use of 
such a structure to any business purpose.141 
In 1996, the Delaware Limited Liability Company Act was amended 
to include the series structure.  Section 18-215(b) provides that: 
[T]he debts, liabilities, obligations and expenses incurred, 
contracted for or otherwise existing with respect to a particular 
series shall be enforceable against the assets of such series only, 
and not against the assets of the limited liability company 
generally or any other series thereof, and, unless otherwise 
provided in the limited liability company agreement, none of the 
debts, liabilities, obligations and expenses incurred, contracted 
for or otherwise existing with respect to the limited liability 
company generally or any other series thereof shall be 
enforceable against the assets of such series.142 
In the same year, the Delaware Revised Uniform Limited Partnership 
Act included Section 17-218, which allowed the creation of a series in a 
Delaware limited partnership.143 
VI. Conclusions:  Convergences Between Civil Law and Common Law 
Traditions 
A. Broadening Horizons of the Common Law Tradition 
A statutory foundation is nececcesry to create an asset partitioning 
within the boundaries of the same legal entity.  The Delaware law reforms, 
which have been followed by seven other States and Puerto Rico,144 
together with the proliferation of the so-called Segregated Portfolio 
Companies (SPCs) throughout non-U.S. jurisdictions,145 confirm this 
 
 141. See id. at 652-53. 
 142. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-215(b)(1996). 
 143. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 17-218 (1996). 
 144. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-215 (2009) (providing for asset partitioning within 
limited liability companies); 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 180/37-40 (2009); IOWA CODE § 
490A.305 (2009); NEV. REV. STAT. §86.296 (2009); OKLA. STAT. tit. 18, §2054.4 (2009); 
TENN. CODE ANN. 48-249-309 (2009); UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2c-606 (2009); P.R. LAWS 
ANN. tit. 14, § 3426(p) (2004).  In addition to Segregated Portfolio Companies legislation 
(which deals with limited liability companies), a number of states provide for the creation of 
series within a trust. See CONN. GEN. STAT. §34-517(b)(2) (2009); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 
3806(b)(2) (2009); MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS. § 12-207(b) (2009); NEV. REV. STAT. 
§ 88A.280 (2009); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 293-B:7, II(d) (2009); VA. CODE ANN. §13.1-
1219 (2009); WYO. STAT. ANN. §17-23-108(b)(ii) (2009). 
 145. In particular:  Bermuda, the British Virgin Islands, the Cayman Islands, Guernsey, 
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determination.  This Article has given such a statutory provision the label 
of property law. 
The possibility of separating assets between different investment 
portfolios without the investors’ consent spares the costs of achieving the 
same result through contracting and, alternatively, the costs of creating 
multiple legal entities.  Multiple legal entities implicitly necessitate the 
duplication of governance structures, expenses, agreements with service 
providers, prospectuses, periodic reports, and other regulatory filings.146  A 
single entity that offers segregated investment portfolios can eliminate the 
costs of duplication while benefiting from the efficiencies of attracting 
diversified categories of creditors. 
In conclusion, the specific case of mutual funds could signal a global 
trend toward the recognition of asset partitioning within the boundaries of 
the same legal entity.  While this structure is familiar to the civil law 
tradition thanks to the “asset independence” doctrine, it seems to have been 
less explored in the common law tradition.  In the future, it will be 
important to observe whether the legal reforms implemented in Delaware, 
which expanded the possibility of using the series structure for any 
business purpose within the boundaries of a business trust, limited liability 
company or limited partnership will lead to a similar alignment between the 
common and civil law traditions for other business practices. 
To this end, a critical factor will be whether, in the future, the series 
structure is also considered in corporate statutes.  The suggested reform 
appears to be the necessary step for filling some of the gaps between the 
common law and civil law traditions that this Article has attempted to 
describe.  Allowing for asset partitioning within the same entity has proven 
an efficient way to overcome the tradeoff between the economies of scale 
that derive from operating multiple transactions under one entity 
(integration), and the efficiency gains that result from asset partitioning 
(tailoring). 
B. Broadening Horizons of the Civil Law Tradition 
Comparative studies on asset partitioning have traditionally focused 
on the possibility of transferring trusts law to a civil law environment.  
Notwithstanding the fact that this Article has come at the matter from the 
opposite perspective, by inquiring as to whether the civil law tradition can 
offer insight to the common law debate on asset partitioning, it seems 
relevant to describe the most recent impacts of trusts law on civil law 
 
Luxembourg, and Mauritius. 
 146. See Victoria E. Schonfeld & Thomas M.J. Kerwin, Organization of a Mutual Fund, 
49 BUS. LAW. 107, 116 (1993) (discussing the costs and benefits of creating multiple legal 
entities). 
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countries. 
At this stage, we would be well served to remember that, in the civil 
law tradition, only in a numerus clausus of circumstances provided by 
property laws is a legal subject able to partition his patrimony into separate 
funds.  Here, what civil law countries have traditionally lacked is a general 
legal scheme able to provide for the partitioning of assets under an 
indefinite number of circumstances. 
The common law tradition has developed trusts law, which has turned 
out to be an extremely flexible device capable of granting asset partitioning 
for a virtually indefinite set of purposes.  In contrast, civil law countries 
have taken an opposite path, granting specific property laws which allow 
asset partitioning for highly scrutinized purposes. 
This pattern began to shift in 1985, thanks to the adoption of The 
Hague Trusts Convention, which has been ratified thus far by Italy, The 
Netherlands,147 Malta, Luxembourg and Switzerland.  This Convention is 
aimed at providing for the recognition of foreign trusts, through the 
application of foreign trust laws, in countries where the trust concept is 
completely unknown.148 
Thus far, many European countries have been reluctant to ratify the 
Hague Convention which, nevertheless, has stimulated a debate in many 
countries over the prospect of a legal device that would share the 
characteristics of a common law trust.  While the small Republic of San 
Marino has decided to fully regulate the trust,149 Luxembourg, Lichtenstein, 
France and Italy, who refuse to introduce such an alien instrument into their 
legal systems, have decided instead to reshape domestic devices for the 
purpose of achieving an outcome functionally resembling that of the 
trust.150  All of these countries, with the exception of Italy,151 preferred to 
 
 147. Notwithstanding the ratification of the Hague Convention, in 1992 the Dutch 
legislator struck down the proposal to introduce a regulation of a national trust. In particular, 
the Legislator added one provision that seems incompatible with the common law trust 
structure:  “A juridical act which is intended to transfer property for purposes of security or 
which does not have the purpose of bringing the property into the patrimony of the acquirer, 
after transfer, does not constitute a valid title for transfer of that property.” Burgerlijk 
Wetboek art. 84, ¶ 3, ch. III. 
 148. See Jonathan Harris, THE HAGUE TRUSTS CONVENTION:  SCOPE, APPLICATION AND 
PRELIMINARY ISSUES 81 (2002) (discussing the scope and aims of The Hague Trusts 
Convention); Donovan W.M. Waters, The Hague Trusts Convention Twenty Years On, in 
COMMERCIAL TRUSTS IN EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW 56 (Michele Graziadei et al. eds., 2005). 
 149. See Trust Act, Law No. 37, art. 63 of March 17, 2005 (San Marino) (finding that 
trusts are “regulated by the law of the Republic of San Marino”). 
 150. Serena Meucci, Contratti di fiducie, destinazione e trust:  l’evoluzione 
dell’ordinamento francese nel quadro europeo, in RIVISTA DI DIRITTO PRIVATO 829, 835 
(2007). 
 151. The Italian civil code has been amended in order to introduce a legal device that 
resembles a trust’s essential features with respect to asset partitioning.  See art. 2645 ter c.c. 
(allowing real and personal property registered for specific interests to be protected from 
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amend the fiducia, a device which originates from ancient Roman Law in 
the concept of fideicomissa, and is deeply rooted in the civil law 
tradition.152 
The fiducia is a contract between the “constituent” (i.e., the settlor) 
and the fiduciario (i.e., the trustee), where determined property is 
transferred to the fiduciario.  The transferred property is dedicated to the 
benefit of a third party (and/or to the benefit of the “constituent”) or to a 
specific purpose, and the fiduciario has the obligation to manage the 
property according to the instructions of the “constituent”.  Upon expiration 
of the contract, the fiduciario must return the property either to the 
“constituent” or to the beneficiaries.  In contrast to the trust, the fiducia 
does not distinguish between legal ownership and equitable/beneficial 
ownership.  Consequently, the fiduciario has full disposal of the property 
and both the constituent and beneficiary after accepting the beneficial 
provision have only a contractual claim toward the fiduciario. 
According to trusts law, if the trustee becomes insolvent, the trust 
property he administers is unavailable to satisfy the trustee's obligations to 
his personal creditors.153 In contrast, in the fiducia, there is no segregation 
of assets between the dedicated property (transferred by the constituent to 
the fiduciario) and personal property of the fiduciario.  Therefore, the 
traditional civil law fiducia does not provide any asset partitioning.154 
In keeping with the civil law tradition where asset partitioning is only 
granted by a specific property law in a limited number of business 
transactions, the fiducia, which can serve an indefinite number of purposes, 
normally lacks the ability to segregate assets without the consent of 
different categories of creditors (the beneficiaries and the fiduciario’s 
personal creditors).155 
Luxembourg, Lichtenstein and France decided to intervene in order to 
provide the fiducia with a property law that would enable a partitioning 
between the managed assets and the personal property of the fiduciario.  In 
particular, the French legislator, through Article 2025 of the French civil 
code provided that the managed assets are the common pledge of only 
 
third party claimants).  A detailed description of this device would be beyond the scope of 
this study.  For further details, see Giacomo Rojas Elgueta, Il rapporto tra l'art. 2645-ter 
c.c. e l'art. 2740 c.c.:  un'analisi economica della nuova disciplina, in BANCA, BORSA, 
TITOLI DI CREDITO 185 (2007). 
 152. See Michele Graziadei, The Development Of Fiducia In Italian And French Law 
From The 14th Century To The End Of The Ancien Régime, in ITINERA FIDUCIAE.  TRUST 
AND TREUHAND IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 327 (Richard Helmholz & Reinhard 
Zimmermann eds., 1998) (discussing the historical development of the fiducia in Italy and 
France). 
 153. Blair, supra note 5, at 392. 
 154. Hansmann & Mattei, supra note 102, at 443-44 and 456. 
 155. Id. at 456. 
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those creditors whose claim is related to the managed property.156  This 
rule, by acknowledging that it would be effectively impossible to create an 
affirmative asset partitioning through contracting, shifts the traditional 
contractual nature of the fiducia device to a new proprietary foundation.157  
Using Hansmann and Kraakman’s terminology, it could be said that the 
French fiducia is a new example of organizational law. 
Notwithstanding the new direction marked by the French law reform 
toward continental acceptance of a legal device which offers affirmative 
asset partitioning to an open-ended set of purposes, there is still a 
remarkable resistance to introducing something as general as the trust.  In 
fact, according to the new French regulation:  A) the fiducia comes to an 
end within the durational limit of ninety-nine years, while the duration of a 
trust is often unlimited;158 B) the fiducia can be constituted only by 
contract, while the trust may be the result of a unilateral declaration by an 
owner of property either during the settlor’s lifetime or by will;159 C) the 
role of fiduciario is reserved only for certain entities having legal 
personality (investment and insurance companies) and for attorneys at 
law.160 
The French reform illustrates the resistance to adopting legal devices 
that diverge from a country’s tradition.  The field of asset partitioning 
offers an interesting case in which financial transactions are becoming the 
primary motivating force in breaching these obstacles and dictating 
uniform global solutions. 
 
 156. Art. 2025 of the French civil code states that “[t]he trust fund's assets can only be 
seized in a legal proceeding by the holders of claims arising from the underlying assets of 
the trust or holders of claims related to the management of the trust.” 
 157. On the new regulation of the French fiducie, see Claude Witz, La fiducie française 
face aux expériences étrangères et à la Convention de La Haye relative au trust, RECUIL 
DALLOZ 1369 (2007); Christian Larroumet, La loi du février 2007 sur la fiducie. Propos 
critique, RECUIL DALLOZ 1350 (2007).  Similar legal reforms have occurred in Latin 
America.  The segregation of assets has been provided for, for example, in the Uruguayan 
law regulating the fiducia.  Normas Sobre Fideicomiso 17.703, ch. I, art. 7.  For further 
information about trusts in Latin American legal systems, see Dante Figueroa, Civil Law 
Trusts in Latin America:  Is the Lack of Trusts an Impediment for Expanding Business 
Opportunities in Latin America?, 24 ARIZ. J. INT’L COMP. L. 701 (2007). 
 158. C. civ. art. 2018.  On the tendency of abolishing the Rule Against Perpetuities in the 
U.S., see Max M. Schanzenbach & Robert H. Sitkoff, Perpetuities or Taxes? Explaining the 
Rise of the Perpetual Trust, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2465 (2006). 
 159. On the testamentary trusts, see Langbein, supra note 21, 636-37. 
 160. C. civ. art. 2015. 
